The contribution sets simple mathematic models describing and explaining the way of behavior of various types of investors (the private and institutionalized ones). The models come from the cardinal utility theory which is used for explaining the connection between the subjective relationship towards risk and some pathologic phenomenon of finance theory (for example the moral hazard question of institutionalized investors) and takes into account the decision making of both ordinary people and professional investors. A reliable estimate of the economic surroundings where the investment should run contributes significantly to a quality of the particular investment decisions. The article contributes to a quality of the investment decision by the original and primary approach to pricing information that lowers the uncertainty in occurrences of the relevant scenarios of the project's development. At the conclusion there is shown how the shift of the decision breaking point shapes the amount of the acceptable price of the information.
Introduction
The contribution deals with the behavior of investors at the moment of the decision-making process concerning purchasing the product (a product investment). By a product we understand both a project (a business plan) and a financial (money and capital) market instrument including the property market (that is a deposit, a loan, a mortgage, securities etc.).
The investment is an act in which we take into consideration the price of a product (the capital expenditure C 0 , which in case of a loan or a mortgage is the present value (PV) of the future installments) and a contemplated outcome 1 . The character of an outcome can be a final one or a transitive one. As for the final outcome we consider a result stated in gross or net form (the present value (PV) or the net present value (NPV) of cash flows resulting from a purchased product). The transitive outcome is meant to be another investment procured from the gross result of the previous one 2 . In such a concept of an investment it is typical for an institutionalized investor (in contrast to a private one) to invest predominantly the loan capital 3 .
The typical institutionalized investor is, for instance, a bank.
Firstly, we formulate a mathematic model of an investment, in which we explain the difference between the utility of a certain wealth and the expected utility of an unbiased estimate of the same value of that wealth. Then we introduce the risk averse behavior of investors in the graphic presentation of the utility function for wealth and point at required corrections that the consideration of financial risk of investment takes in the NPV rule. Finally, we reveal why banks, where the state guarantees the creditors´ deposits, invest in the way they invest.
The mathematic model of investment
This presented model of an investment comes out of the general model of a lottery 4 and, besides the uncertainty of the outcome, develops it in the manner of taking into account the financial risk resulting from the variability of a return rate 5 that is included in the PV and NPV calculation. The inclusion is performed by either the nominal values of cash flow adjustments (the certainty-equivalent method) or by the discount rate increase of so-called risk-premium
(the model CAPM -capital asset pricing model). We get the same result in both cases 6 .
An investment I is the particular lottery gamble 7 which takes on two possible outcomes (prizes)
x and y with probabilities p and (1 -p). Its formal notation is
The Cost of Information in Dependence on the Investor Relation to the Risk 75 which means: by the realization of an investment the investor receives either the outcome x with probability p or the outcome y with probability (1 -p). Figure 1 As we mentioned in the introduction, the outcome can be the result (in gross or net form) or another investment. If the outcome is not specified we label it with a small letter (see Figure   1a ). If the outcome is an investment it is labeled with a capital letter. In the case of the gross form result it is given by its PV value (see Figure 1b) . If all of the outcomes are final ones thus because of NPV = −C 0 + PV we can state them in the net form through their net present values (NPV -see Figure 1c ). The probability of a result is given by the probability of incidence of an assumed scenario development in which framework the result is estimated. The probability of the next investment is the degree of anticipation 8 with which the gross result of the previous investment will be reinvested into this investment 9 .
Reduction and composition of investments
The model of lottery comes out of the following elementary assumptions 10 :
(the order in which the lottery is described is irrelevant),
•y …(the reduction of compound lotteries illustrated in Figure 2 ).
The equivalence (~) between the expressions in the third assumption defines the rule of reduction of compound lotteries to a single lottery (one-shot lottery) in the particular case with two possible results x and y. The rule respects the incompatibility of the same results at various re-runs of the attempt and its mutual dependence (y
; at the same time it proceeds from the assumption that the gambler treats the lottery just and only according to the final results and their probabilities and he does not care about the time factor too much. However, it is the time factor that causes the different gamblers´ perception of one-shot lotteries and compound lotteries. The time factor (as well as the risk rate) is relevantly respected in it and that is why the above mentioned difference in gamblers' perception of lotteries does not occur here.
The rule of composition can be attained by reversing the use of the reduction rule which enables us to put together the one-shot investments of arbitrary numbers of outcomes out of the two unrepeatable investment outcomes -see the following examples of generating the three and four investment outcomes:
This approach is well defined which proves the fact that p
representation of the last instance (generating the one-shot four investment outcomes) is shown in Figure 3 . 
The Cost of Information in Dependence on the Investor Relation to the Risk
where lg marks the logarithm to the base 2. The unit of such a defined uncertainty is the average uncertainty of a result of a toss-up. It is the highest uncertainty that can be related to the investment (H = 1) and it appears if both of the results are equally probable (uncertain).
The information and uncertainty in the Shannon conception are the complementary terms (the amount of information contained in the message is given by the amount of removed uncertainty by the message). The additional information benefit of the reliability of the considered scenarios of possible development 13 lies in the fact that additional information changes the prior distribution over scenarios and so the prior distribution over the results of an Figure   4 that the interval 〈M pes , M opt 〉 can be pushed to the left without a change of C 0 (with all the mentioned effects) by either increasing the discount rate or by reducing the certainty-equivalents of the gross result values.
Pricing of information
Let us suppose the initial situation marked in Figure 5 Then let us suppose that we know there is a piece of knowledge that is not free of charge at disposal that would lower the initial entropy about ∆H (0 < ∆H < 1). The question is:
"For what price does it pay one off to get this information? "
We answer the question with help of the graph describing the dependence H on p introduced in Figure 6 . There we can see that lowering the initial entropy about ∆H is a consequence of the change of the initial probability p = 0.5 about ∆p in favor of one of the possible results. If the knowledge brings a greater chance for the result NPV opt , it directs ∆p to the right, if it be to the contrary it directs ∆p to the left. If it does not come to a change of the sign at any of these shifts, the knowledge is not interesting from the investment decision making point of view because the initial decision will not be influenced by it.
In the opposite case from the acceptable price of information point of view what is interesting is the value P of the overhanging arrow ∆E behind the point 0 on the NPV axis in Figure 5 , which is also the upper limit of the acceptable price of the knowledge. It indicates the possibility that the knowledge changes the initial decision, by which it comes to the expected saving (or income) worth of P compared to the decision without the knowledge. This consideration is also Figure 5 and the P overhanging reaches the positive half axis NPV). We include both possibilities by assigning P = ∆E -|E[NPV I ]| and then we consider only the nonnegative P values.
The link of the wealth utility with the uncertainty and risk of an investment
The criterion of the economic choice is the utility maximization. The decision about accepting or refusing the investment I is a choice between two commodities: The certain wealth To show where the generalization of the rule NPV to E[NPV] is or is not in agreement with the utility maximization criterion is one of the aims of this contribution. Below we proceed from the cardinal conception of the wealth utility that as we suppose is measurable and expressible by the function u: R → R, in which the negative values of the wealth M mean a debt and the negative values of utility U mean a detriment.
The current (certain) and the expected (uncertain) utility
The hatched curve line u M in Figure 4 illustrates the dependability of certain utility values U(M) on the nonnegative values of the certain wealth M. Its concave shape is consistent with the principle of a diminishing marginal utility which says that from a certain amount of wealth the additional satisfaction obtained from the last added unit of a commodity is diminishing.
For uncertain expected values of unbiased estimates regarding the investment I it holds:
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The foregoing system of relations is the parametric equation of the line segment marked as u E with extreme points (M pes , U(M pes )) and (M opt , U(M opt )) in segment u E over the interval 〈M pes , M opt 〉. The excess of u M over u E says that the investor prefers the certainty to the uncertainty which is explained as the risk aversion 15 . It is also possible to imagine the investor (or rather the "gambler") with a risk-proclivity who does not regard the uncertainty as danger but as opportunity 16 . His curve u M over the interval 〈M pes , M opt 〉 would be of a convex shape. In case of a risk neutral investor, u M and u E would join. Under certain circumstances there could alternate the sections of the risk aversion and the risk proclivity over the interval 〈M pes , M opt 〉 (see Figure 7) . 
The rule E[NPV] versus the maximization utility criterion
In Figure 4 we can see that the utility of the current wealth M 0 is U The decision breaking point shift influences investment decisions of banks and others institutionalized investors negatively in case the state guarantees the savers´ deposits. In Figure 7 we analyze the case of refunding the loss to the extend of 75% of all the deposits by the state.
On the horizontal axis in Figure We can see that the shift about Δ to the right marks the price of information up from the investor point of view (it makes it more desirable), the shift about Δ to the left depreciates it (it makes it less desirable because it does not depend on the quality of the decision too much in this case).
Notes

